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The Impact of Commodity Benchmarks on Derivatives Markets: The Case of 
the Dated Brent Assessment and Brent Futures 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the response of ICE Brent Crude futures to the spot Dated Brent benchmark published 
by Platts. Trading activity in the futures market intensifies during the benchmark assessment. We 
also find trading in the direction of the published benchmark during the price assessment window. 
Aligned positions and a substantially increased arrival rate of informed traders suggest that 
sophisticated traders, taking advantage of a rise in uninformed trading activity, induce the price 
run-up in Brent futures, ahead of the Dated Brent assessment end. The general increase in the 
arrival rate of both informed and uninformed traders during the assessment window underlines the 
benchmark’s relevance and its potential for attracting liquidity. Our results are robust to alternative 
specifications and underscore the significance of physical commodity benchmarks as critical 
elements of the financial market infrastructure. 
 
JEL classification: G13, G14, Q02, Q41 
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1. Introduction 
Benchmarks occupy a central role in stimulating the flow of information between exchange-
traded and over-the-counter (OTC) instruments by establishing settlement prices and improving 
transparency (see Duffie et al., 2016). Due to their importance, benchmarks and their 
administration are increasingly gaining the attention of regulatory bodies in relation to their 
architecture and the regulatory oversight they are or should be subjected to (see FCA, 2015).1 With 
regards to oil, the most actively traded and one of the most economically important commodities 
in the world, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has set out 
recommendations aimed at enhancing the quality and reliability of its price benchmarks. 
Nevertheless, the administration of spot oil benchmarks currently remains unregulated. The EU 
legislation on benchmarks, to be applied from January 2018 onwards, will be the first 
comprehensive regulatory framework under which physical commodity benchmarks can be 
considered for direct supervision. Several price reporting agencies (PRA)2 currently assess and 
                                                        
1 In 2012, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published the Principles for Oil Price 
Reporting Agencies. Starting with the LIBOR, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced the first regulatory 
benchmark regime in April 2013. Two years later, in April 2015, the FCA expanded its regulatory supervision to 
seven other key benchmarks: LIBOR, SONIA, RONIA, WM/Reuters London 4pm Closing Spot Rate, ISDAFIX, 
LBMA Gold Price Fixing, LBMA Silver Price Fixing and the ICE Brent Index (FCA, 2015). The 2015 and 2016 Fair 
and Effective Markets Review, conducted by the Bank of England (BoE), HM Treasury (HMT), and the FCA, identify 
several shortcomings in the Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities (FICC) markets and from July 2016, the 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) regards the manipulation of benchmarks as a civil offence across the EU. The EU 
Benchmarks Regulation will enter into force at the beginning of 2018. 
2 PRAs classify themselves as media organizations and information providers, collecting and channeling commodity 
market intelligence into independent benchmark prices. The four major PRAs are Platts, Argus, ICIS and OPIS. 
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publish oil benchmark prices, however the Dated Brent benchmark, operated by S&P Global’s 
Platts, has come to dominate this space. The Platts Dated Brent benchmark prices approximately 
67% of the global physical (spot) oil traded (Davis, 2012). This dominance also underscores its 
importance to the derivatives/financial (paper) markets for oil. 
Following unannounced searches of the offices of several crude oil market participants by 
the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)3 in early 2013, 
reports of price distortion of the Platts Dated Brent benchmark began to emerge in the financial 
press (see as examples Kemp, 2013; Mackey and Lawler, 2013; Makan et al., 2013; Van Voris et 
al., 2013). More recent news suggests that trading activities at the interface between the physical 
and financial oil market are still controversial (see as examples Cooper, 2017; Hurst and Blas, 
2017). Despite these reports, a limited number of studies have analyzed the impact of the Dated 
Brent benchmark assessment on financial oil markets more generally. To the best of our 
knowledge, only Inci and Seyhun (2015) and Swinand and O'Mahoney (2014) have utilized Platts 
benchmark data. Inci and Seyhun (2015) examine the market dynamics between the spot and 
futures markets and report a high level of integration, while Swinand and O'Mahoney (2014) 
examine calendar spreads in order to identify instances of price anomalies in the Brent crude 
complex. The difficulty in using calendar spreads lies in the increasing level of spread mispricing 
as the front month futures contract approaches maturity (see Frino and McKenzie, 2002).  
In this paper, we examine trading behavior in the ICE Brent Crude futures contract around 
the assessment of the Dated Brent benchmark price, computed daily by Platts based on the trading 
activity in the North Sea spot oil market. Of particular interest is the 30-minute window from the 
                                                        
3 Please refer to http://www.shellnews.net/documents/WhiteOaksFund.pdf and http://www.businessweek.com/
pdfs/crude-complaint-11-6.pdf for further information. 
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start to the end of the daily Dated Brent price assessment at precisely 16:30 London time — 
otherwise known as the Platts Window. Specifically, based on the assumption of a pricing error-
correction relationship (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1995) between the physical and financial oil markets, we 
hypothesize that both markets are integrally linked such that Brent futures will be sensitive to the 
Platts Dated Brent benchmark assessment. Secondly, based on the informational relevance of the 
intersection of the two crude oil market dimensions (i.e. the physical and the financial oil markets), 
we investigate whether participants in the Platts Dated Brent benchmark assessment, having 
become privy to the trading pressure evidenced during the assessment, drive the Brent futures price 
in the direction of the Dated Brent benchmark assessment. 
Our results provide evidence of a significant increase in trading activity in the ICE Brent 
Crude futures contract during the Dated Brent price assessment. We also show that an informed 
trader could earn average profits of between 8 bps and 24 bps during the 30-minute benchmark 
assessment, as Brent futures experience a significant price run-up in the direction of the impending 
benchmark price. The price run-up is followed by a price reversal. Furthermore, benchmark-
aligned trade order imbalances and acceleration in the arrival rate of informed traders during the 
Platts Window suggest that the directional trading behavior is at least partly information-driven.4 
Nevertheless, uninformed traders also participate in the Brent futures market during the Platts 
Window. Indeed the presence of uninformed traders is critical to the price discovery process in the 
futures market. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) show that informed traders earn 
                                                        
4 Data limitations complicate our attempts to disentangle the trading practices leading to directional trading behavior. 
However, the common feature making the directional trading worthwhile is, arguably, an informational advantage, 
most plausibly gained in the physical crude oil market. In this paper, given our findings, we reason in favor of informed 
trading activity leading to a ‘correct’ futures price adjustment during the ongoing physical benchmark assessment. 
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arbitrage gains when trading with uninformed traders. This form of price discovery ensures the 
transfer of private information from informed traders to the rest of the market. 
This study makes two key contributions to the literature. Firstly, we undertake an empirical 
analysis of the fundamental spot crude oil event, the Dated Brent benchmark assessment, and the 
intraday response of Brent futures traded on ICE Futures Europe. Our results underscore the 
significance of physical commodity benchmarks as integral elements of the global financial market 
infrastructure and price discovery in commodity markets. Secondly, our analysis of information-
related interactions between two market structures is unique in that the benchmark assessment 
window by Platts provides a natural experiment to examine the dynamics between the oil spot and 
derivatives markets. This differs from other fixing events such as in the precious metals market, 
where the benchmark fixing period length is indeterminate (see Caminschi and Heaney, 2014), or 
in the case of information events that do not have a precise release timestamp (see Vega, 2006; 
Tetlock, 2010; Bernile et al., 2016).  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section presents the 
institutional background to the study and discusses the existing related literature; section three 
introduces the data; section four sets out the methodology and results; and section five concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1. Institutional Details 
Variability in the grades of oil available for trade at any point in time compels spot traders 
to apply ‘formula pricing’ to value any contracted cargo of crude oil, by adding or subtracting a 
spread to an agreed benchmark price as calculated by a PRA (Dunn and Holloway, 2012). The 
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PRA publishing the industry-leading benchmark price for Dated Brent is Platts.5 Dated Brent refers 
to the price of a physical cargo of North Sea Brent, Forties, Oseberg or Ekofisk (BFOE) crude oil 
with an assigned loading date for shipping — a dated cargo. Platts operates an online data-entry 
and communications system called eWindow that is used to establish the Dated Brent benchmark 
price in the Market on Close (MOC) process.6 The MOC methodology has the advantage of 
promoting liquidity, as it concentrates spot market activity over a short timeframe at the end of the 
day (Barret, 2012a). Our investigation focuses on the daily half-hour (16:00 – 16:30) window 
during which the Dated Brent is computed. During this half-hour assessment window, Platts 
considers a combination of three physical OTC variables: (i) physical North Sea cargoes; (ii) short-
term swaps between Dated Brent and Forward Brent (i.e. Contracts for Difference, CFD); and (iii) 
outright Forward Brent (also called cash BFOE). The window itself can be divided into three 
phases, determined by cut-off periods. During the first phase, market participants submit new 
bids/offers for physical North Sea cargoes, traded as a differential to Dated Brent or Forward Brent; 
the new entry cut-off for this is 16:10:00. New bids/offers for CFD contracts are assessed in the 
second phase, with a new entry cut-off of 16:15:00. The third cut-off for new outright cash BFOE 
bids/offers is 16:25:00. Notwithstanding the specified cut-offs for new entries, existing physical 
North Sea bids/offers and CFD bids/offers may be amended until 16:25:00. Finally, prices for cash 
BFOE can be changed until the window close at 16:30:00. This last phase is judged to be of critical 
importance and described as particularly stressful for both Platts and the physical market 
participants, not least because cash BFOE is the last and only element of the assessment traded at 
                                                        
5 Dated Brent is estimated to serve as a price marker for anywhere between 50% and 80% of the world’s physical 
crude oil trade (see Barret, 2012a, b; Davis, 2012; Dunn and Holloway, 2012; Mathur, 2013; Tuson, 2014). 
6 Please refer to Appendix 1 for more details. 
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a flat price. Based on these three inputs, Platts calculates a price for each of the four North Sea 
grades (Brent, Forties, Oseberg, Ekofisk),7 with the cheapest grade setting the daily Dated Brent 
price. The Dated Brent price reflects the transactable value precisely at 16:30:00 London time.  
Only a limited number of companies, mastering the operational and logistical requirements 
of trading spot oil, participate in physical oil trading via eWindow. The firms are also required to 
satisfy Platts’ due diligence requirements. According to multiple sources and discussions with the 
industry, there is only a handful of active trading companies participating each day (see also 
Fattouh, 2011; Barret, 2012a). In addition to the trading participants, a larger but still limited 
number of subscribers to Platts’ fee-based Global Alert (PGA) real-time information service can 
follow the live physical trading activity and order-flow information (transactions, bids, asks) 
throughout the benchmark assessment period.8 
2.2. Related Literature 
Recent theoretical research by Duffie et al. (2016) highlights the key role benchmarks play 
in enhancing price transparency and liquidity in the underlying market. Several empirical studies 
examine the effects of benchmarks and their operation on the trading behavior of related 
derivatives, some reporting a positive and others a negative impact. This literature is limited and 
restricted to the precious metals, fixed income and foreign exchange markets. The assessment 
procedures of these markets differ significantly from that of the oil market. 
                                                        
7 Prices for the four grades vary due to differing oil qualities. 
8 We interchangeably refer to the Platts process as the assessment or fixing. Unlike several other commodities, such 
as the precious metals market, the physical oil market has no official fixing system. However, over time a few PRAs 
have adopted the role of benchmark administrators.  
 7 
In the precious metals market, Caminschi and Heaney (2014) examine the short-term 
reaction of gold futures and exchange-traded funds (ETF) to the London PM Gold price fixing, 
and conclude that information from the benchmark assessment proceeding (for example, price 
direction) leaks into the gold derivatives market well before the official price publication. 
Similarly, Aspris et al. (2015) investigate the effects of the replacement of a traditional closed 
fixing auction for precious metals with a more transparent and enhanced electronic-based auction 
platform on related futures contracts. They show that the new regulated regime leads to a 
significant improvement in market quality. In terms of the fixed income market, several studies 
examine market dynamics around the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2012) describe patterns suggestive of collusion and manipulation of the 1-month LIBOR rate, 
while Fouquau and Spieser (2015) find that their identification of manipulating banks corresponds 
to those classified by the regulator as having played a major role in the 2012 LIBOR scandal. 
Monticini and Thornton (2013) show that the underreporting of LIBOR quotes by certain 
participating banks likely led to reduced rates. Additionally, Evans (2016) reports asymmetric 
behavior in price changes and volatility for 21 currency pairs during the WM/Reuters London 4pm 
FX benchmark fixing vis-à-vis normal trading periods. Contrary to the expectations of dealers 
sharing risks, Evans (2016) identifies trading strategies consistent with collusive and manipulative 
behavior that lend themselves to significant economic trading opportunities. More recently, several 
studies focus on the reformation of financial benchmarks in light of a number of regulatory 
investigations (e.g., Duffie and Stein, 2015; Perkins and Mortby, 2015).  
The benchmark structure, process and operation in these markets are, however, different to 
those in place for oil markets in terms of design, transparency and regulation. The question 
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remains: what is the observed response of the paper oil market to the assessment of the key spot 
oil benchmark? 
2.3. Directional Trading 
Directional trading — the adoption of a futures position during the assessment window that 
is aligned with the benchmark outcome,9 can result from a number of different trading practices 
by different participant groups. For example, such trading behavior could be due to an intention to 
manipulate the market by influencing the benchmark price direction, and simultaneously executing 
an aligned futures position. Makan (2013) cites an anonymous trader in an interview with the 
Financial Times, stating that “[t]he game of having a leveraged position in the futures market and 
then trying to change the Platts price by a few cents is as old as the market itself”. While alleged 
manipulation may be one possibility, it is not within the scope of this study. Secondly, a trader 
could also anticipate the benchmark direction through Brent futures speculation based on 
intelligence gained in the physical spot market, through either commercial participation or 
proprietary commodities trading, for example. A third reason is linked to spot-futures arbitrage 
activity based on the fundamental value relationship between spot and futures. Arbitrageurs are 
strictly defined as being informed from a market microstructure perspective (e.g., Chordia et al., 
2008; Moore and Payne, 2011), and thus contribute to the futures price discovery during the Platts 
assessment window by speedily translating information from the spot market into futures prices. 
Fourthly, trading in futures could further arise due to natural hedging activity of commercial users 
in order to cover physical exposure. The common feature making any of the above worthwhile is 
                                                        
9 In the context of this paper directional trading strictly refers to this definition, and not to other strategies such as 
directional options trading. 
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arguably an informational advantage, most plausibly gained in the physical crude oil market. As 
an example, consider a physical market participant such as a commercial user who is closely 
monitoring the oil market and is thus informed of the spot market fundamentals such as demand 
and supply. The informed trader can try to anticipate the dynamics during the Platts Window, and 
aligns his futures positions accordingly. Benchmark submitters naturally belong to this category 
of traders. Alternatively, as physical trade and order flow is revealed during the Platts assessment, 
an informed trader can continuously judge the extent to which the information is incorporated into 
the futures price, and act if he identifies a divergence from the fundamental spot-futures 
relationship. Both examples would lead to a futures price adjustment in the direction of the Dated 
Brent fixing outcome ahead of its assessment end. 
Wang (2002) and Frino et al. (2016) argue that hedgers may indeed be informed, given their 
proximity to the underlying good or customer, and this may also hold true for the spot oil market. 
In our case, however, the hedging theory does not align with the results presented in this paper. In 
order to hedge a physical transaction executed during the Platts Dated Brent benchmark 
assessment, a futures position in the opposing direction to the spot fixing would need to be adopted. 
As illustrated above, the more plausible explanations are physical market-informed futures 
speculation or spot-futures arbitrage. 
3. Data and Study Design 
Intraday data for the ICE Brent Crude futures and the Brent-Forties-Oseberg (BFO) crude 
oil spot, with identifiers LCOc1 and BFO- respectively, are obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Tick History (TRTH) database. Both datasets include trade and quote information time stamped 
to the nearest millisecond. The Brent Crude futures are listed for each month 7 years forward, and 
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are cash settled against the ICE Brent Index.10 We sample only the front month, closest-to-maturity 
futures contract and rollover to the next contract at expiry.11 The BFO spot price, constructed by 
Thomson Reuters, is based on a combination of the futures price (either ICE Brent or NYMEX 
WTI, depending on the time of the day), Exchange Futures for Physical (EFP)12 values, and the 
ICE close. The BFO serves as a public estimate of the intraday oil price in light of the OTC nature 
of oil markets. We use the BFO series as an approximation of the Brent crude oil spot price 
immediately ahead of the Platts Window start at t-31 = 15:59 (see Figure 1). Finally, we acquire 
price data for the daily Dated Brent benchmark, with identifier PCAAS00, from Platts Singapore. 
The Platts data contain daily Dated Brent prices timestamped at 16:30 London time. Our full period 
of investigation comprises of observations from 9th January 2012 to 31st March 2016 inclusive, 
some 1,056 trading days. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We sample data over the 120-minute window of investigation [t-60 = 15:30, t59 = 17:29] 
covering an hour before and after the Dated Brent assessment end for each trading day d, as 
depicted in Figure 1. The pre-benchmark estimation window extends [t-60 = 15:30, t-31 = 15:59] 
and the post-event window covers [t0 = 16:30, t+59 = 17:29]. The event time, t0 = 16:30 London 
                                                        
10 Our analysis does not focus on the ICE Brent Index that is published only on a monthly basis for cash settlement 
purposes, following the expiry of the ICE Brent Crude futures front month contract. 
11 Using only the nearest maturity contracts is consistent with the literature on commodity derivatives. This is mainly 
because the nearby futures contract is typically the most liquid, whereas the longer-dated contracts are predominantly 
thinly traded. 
12 An EFP allows traders to exchange a Brent futures position for a cash BFOE (forward) position and vice versa. 
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local time, refers to the start of the interval covering the 16:30:00 Platts Dated Brent price. The 
Platts assessment or event window encompasses [t-30 = 16:00, t-1 = 16:29].
13 
4. Empirical Analysis, Results and Discussions 
4.1. Relative Volume and Volatility Evolution Around the Dated Brent Benchmark 
Assessment 
Consistent with Caminschi and Heaney (2014), we begin our analysis by examining the 
evolution of ICE Brent Crude futures intraday relative volume and volatility around the Dated 
Brent benchmark assessment window. We compute these measures for each interval t during the 
window of investigation, relative to a reference value measured over the 30-minute estimation 
window, [t-60 = 15:30, t-31 = 15:59], for each trading day d, and then average across all sample 
trading days D. The 30-minute estimation window reflects the average level of activity on d, 
independent of the benchmark assessment process. 
The average relative volume per interval t is computed as follows: 
 𝑉𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑑 =
1
30
∑ ln(𝑉𝑀𝑡,𝑑)
−31
𝑡=−60
  (1) 
 𝑉𝑀𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝐷
∑
(ln(𝑉𝑀𝑡,𝑑) −𝑉𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑑)
𝑉𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑑
𝑑∈𝐷   (2) 
where VMt,d is defined as the total trading volume in Brent futures during any given 1-minute 
interval t on day d. 𝑉𝑀𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average difference for each 1-minute interval t, between the log 
volume and the reference volume on day d, scaled by the reference volume on d such that it yields 
the percentage volume increase or decrease relative to the estimation window. The log 
                                                        
13 All time specifications are in London local time. During summer time, London local time corresponds to British 
Summer Time (BST = GMT + 1), whereas during the winter, London local time corresponds to GMT. BST begins at 
01:00 GMT on the last Sunday of March and ends at 01:00 GMT on the last Sunday of October. 
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transformation normalizes the data, mitigates the skewness effect caused by the zero bound on 
volume, and improves the robustness of the subsequent t-tests (Caminschi and Heaney, 2014).  
To measure Brent futures price volatility for each interval t of the window of investigation, 
we compute the standard deviation of 1-second returns within each 1-minute interval t on trading 
day d, and follow the same rationale as described in Equation 1 and Equation 2.14 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Results for the relative trading volume and volatility are reported in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
For parsimony, we only report the sub-window [t-35 = 15:55, t+5 = 16:35] of the full 120-minute 
window under investigation in Table 1. This sub-window covers 5 minutes before the fixing start 
and 5 minutes after the assessment end; the approach does not result in any loss of information.  
Relative volume, as well as relative volatility, show enhanced values during the Platts Dated 
Brent price assessment. For 𝑉𝑀𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in Panel A of Table 1 and Figure 2, the increase in trading 
intensity coincides with the start of the Platts Window (t-30 = 16:00) and falls sharply thereafter 
(t+1 = 16:31). Average relative trade volume for ICE Brent Crude futures inflates by approximately 
5.5% at the fixing start and rises to 36.3% above pre-benchmark assessment levels, with the highest 
trading volume recorded immediately prior to the end of the Dated Brent price assessment by Platts 
                                                        
14 We also compute the Garman and Klass (1980) volatility estimator, specified as follows: 
 𝑉𝑡,𝑑 = √
1
2
(ln (
𝐻𝑡,𝑑
𝐿𝑡,𝑑
))
2
−(2 ln(2) −1) (ln (
𝐶𝑡,𝑑
𝑂𝑡,𝑑
))
2
   
where Ht,d, Lt,d, Ot,d, Ct,d refer to high, low, open and close prices for the interval t on day d respectively. The results 
obtained with this approach are qualitatively similar to those reported for the 1-minute standard deviation estimates. 
Moreover, we calculate the average relative trade size using the same approach. For parsimony, the results, which are 
consistent with other trading activity measures, and a short discussion are presented in Appendix 2 to this paper. 
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(t-1 = 16:29). Following the completion of the fixing, 𝑉𝑀𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  gradually reverts to pre-event levels. 
The increase in relative trading volume is statistically significant at the 1% level and persists for 
30 minutes. Panel B of Table 1 and Figure 2 report volatility behavior in ICE Brent Crude futures 
contracts. Relative volatility increases significantly by 23.1% immediately after the fixing start, 
and remains several percentage points above estimation window levels for the next 15 minutes 
(from t-28 = 16:02 to t-14 = 16:16). Volatility rises significantly again and peaks at 59.2% above 
estimation levels just before the Dated Brent Window end at 16:30. The last five minutes of the 
benchmark assessment are characterized by a particularly volatile futures market. As we observe 
in relation to volume, volatility declines at the fixing end and remains depressed during the post-
event window (see Figure 2). Overall, the results for the intervals during the 30-minute Platts 
Window from 16:00 (t-30) to 16:29 (t-1) are, for the most part, significantly different from zero for 
both measures. Trading activity peaks immediately before the Platts Window end, and is succeeded 
by a general decline thereafter. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Collectively, these findings strongly support our expectation that the financial oil market is 
sensitive to the Platts Dated Brent benchmark assessment, highlighting the benchmark process as 
an essential spot crude oil information event. The trading activity results imply that an unusually 
high number of traders arrive at the market after the fixing start and prior to the fixing end, as 
demonstrated by the high volume, and the Brent futures market is uncommonly ‘alert and nervous’ 
during the event window, as documented by the volatility levels. In the following sections, we 
further examine this view by conducting an analysis of the evolution of informed trading around 
the benchmark period. 
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4.2. Returns Analysis around the Dated Brent Benchmark Assessment 
In order to evaluate our expectations regarding informed directional trading, we compute the 
simple and directional returns available to both ‘uninformed’ and ‘informed’ participants, 
respectively. The directional returns are a measure of hypothetical gains available to a trader who 
has an informational advantage over the general market. It is plausible that the informational 
advantage is derived from physical oil market intelligence, enabling, for example, futures 
speculation based on an ex ante approximation of the direction of the Dated Brent benchmark 
assessment, or spot-futures arbitrage incorporating information as the fixing progresses. 
 
Simple Returns 
Simple returns are those available to a random long only investor, measured using the closing 
price Ct,d, for each 1-minute interval t on trading day d. We standardize the returns across our 
sample periods as follows: 
 𝑆𝑅𝑡,𝑑 = ln (
𝐶𝑡,𝑑
𝐶𝑡−1,𝑑
)  (3) 
 𝑆𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝐷
∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑡,𝑑𝑑∈𝐷   (4) 
 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡
𝑡=−60 − ∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−31
𝑡=−60   (5) 
𝑆𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ describes the returns for interval t averaged across all trading days D; CSRt measures 
cumulative simple returns in excess of an offsetting factor (see Equation 5) such that CSR-31 = 0 
(Caminschi and Heaney, 2014), making it easier to determine the evolution of cumulative returns 
during the benchmark assessment process [t-30 = 16:00, t-1 = 16:29]. 
 
Directional Returns 
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In order to measure returns attributable to an informed trader who trades in the direction of 
the benchmark assessment outcome in advance of its release, we compute directional returns. We 
follow Ederington and Lee (1995) and Caminschi and Heaney (2014) and sign simple returns using 
a spot fixing direction parameter. The direction factor takes the value of +1 (-1) if the published 
Platts Dated Brent price (t0) on day d is higher (lower) than the price of the BFO crude oil spot on 
d immediately prior to the start of the Platts Window (t-31), assuming that the informed trader takes 
a long (short) position (see Figure 1). Based on this, our sample contains 527 positive, 521 
negative, and 8 flat assessment days. Directional returns are hypothetical, and measured for each 
1-minute interval t as follows: 
 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑑 = {
+1, 𝐷𝐵0,𝑑 > 𝐶𝑆−31,𝑑
−1, 𝐷𝐵0,𝑑 < 𝐶𝑆−31,𝑑
0, 𝐷𝐵0,𝑑 = 𝐶𝑆−31,𝑑
  (6) 
 𝐷𝑅𝑡,𝑑 = 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑑 × 𝑆𝑅𝑡,𝑑  (7) 
 𝐷𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝐷
∑ 𝐷𝑅𝑡,𝑑𝑑∈𝐷   (8) 
 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐷𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡
𝑡=−60 − ∑ 𝐷𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−31
𝑡=−60   (9) 
where DB and CS in Equation 6 are the prices of Dated Brent and the BFO crude spot 
approximation in interval t on trading day d, respectively. The cumulative directional returns 
(CDRt) represent the attainable gain through directional trading during the event window.
15 
                                                        
15 We remove the 8 flat fixing days from our analysis since the zero returns would attenuate the averaged outcome on 
positive and negative fixing days. There is no material difference in results. 
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In order to address the inherent relationship between directional trading based on spot market 
information and the futures market price movement,16 we apply additional tests that isolate the 
spurious correlation between the futures returns and the direction parameter, consistent with 
Ederington and Lee (1995, EL).17 This is achieved by assigning FIXDIRt,d = 1 if (R-31,0 – Rt) > 0, 
FIXDIRt,d = -1 if (R-31,0 – Rt) < 0, and FIXDIRt,d = 0 if (R-31,0 – Rt) = 0 for intervals within the event 
window, where R-31,0 is defined as log(DB0,d / CS-31,d) and Rt is the log(CSt / CSt-1). Hence, the 
directional parameter for interval t within the window is based on the sign of the spot return over 
the other 29 minutes of the Platts assessment.18 For intervals [t-60 = 15:30, t-31 = 15:59] and [t0 = 
16:30, t+59 = 17:29] outside of the Platts Window, the direction parameter is determined as 
specified in Equation 6. The EL approach can be considered as a conservative robustness test of 
the directional return measure.19 
                                                        
16 The correlation coefficient of close-to-close Brent futures returns and the close-to-close Platts Dated Brent returns 
based on prices at 16.30 London time amounts to 0.97. However, the coefficient of the correlation determined based 
on the sign of (1) the difference between futures prices at 16.30 and 16.00, and (2) the difference between the Platts 
Dated Brent benchmark at 16.30 and the BFO crude spot price at 16.00 is considerably lower, at 0.53. 
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
18 Under the standard directional measure, we test whether the futures return of interval t within the 30-minute window 
is correlated with the overall 30-minute spot direction. Given the close co-movement between the spot and futures 
market, it may appear that the return in interval t is correlated with the spot direction; however, it is actually only 
correlated with the overall 30-minute futures return. Hence, in order to avoid this correlation with itself (since the 
interval return is part of the 30-minute return), we compute the direction for each interval t within the window using 
the sign of the spot return of the other 29 minutes. 
19 Given that the last five minutes of the Dated Brent assessment are considered crucial (as described in sub-section 
2.1 and identified by the evolution of the volume and volatility in Figure 2), we implement a conservative third 
directional return measure. In this case the FIXDIR is determined by the sign of the differential between the Dated 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 reports the directional ICE Brent Crude futures returns around the Platts benchmark 
assessment using the two directional parameters. In Table 2, we report the ICE Brent Crude futures 
returns in 10-minute pooled batches across the full window of investigation.20 The returns 
associated with both are referred to as DR and EL30R respectively. 
The cumulative simple returns plot for Brent futures in Panel A of Table 2 illustrates the 
responsiveness of the futures market to the daily benchmark assessment. This is supported by 
significantly negative 𝑆𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ values during the 30-minute Platts Window in Panel A of Figure 3. In 
Panel B of Table 2 we report the directional returns attributable to a physical market-informed 
futures trader. An immediate and significant directional return is observed with the start of the 
fixing (t-30), a pattern which carries forward throughout the assessment process — all 10-minute 
intervals exhibit significance at the 1% level. Further, the 𝐷𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ of intervals during the final phase 
of the benchmark assessment are particularly pronounced, measuring on average 10.6 bps from 
16:20 to 16:29. Following the benchmark assessment end (t0) the pattern in directional returns is 
reversed and falls to zero. The returns for the other 10-minute batches outside the 30-minute 
assessment window are smaller in magnitude, mostly insignificant, and depict no discernible 
pattern. 
The cumulative directional returns in Panel A of Figure 3 represent the hypothetical gains 
attainable through directional trading in Brent futures during the Platts Window. There is an 
important run-up in CDR instantly after the fixing start and prior to the fixing end. As demonstrated 
                                                        
Brent price and the BFO spot price five minutes before the assessment end. The unreported results are smaller in 
magnitude but consistent with those reported in Table 2. 
20 For parsimony we do not report the minute-by-minute results; however, the results are available on request. 
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in Panel A of Figure 3, the clear and continuous trend in directional futures returns during the event 
window suggests that the trading activity, such as spot market-informed futures speculation or 
informed spot-futures arbitrage, leads to an adjustment of almost 24 bps on average. The trend of 
the Brent futures price in the ‘right’ direction prior to the daily Platts Window end amounts to 16.5 
bps during positive assessments, and 30.8 bps during negative assessments. The steepening of the 
CDR curve from t-7 onwards underlines the importance of the final minutes of the Platts Window. 
This pattern is followed by a reversal on negative days, possibly due to overshooting in the market. 
However, on positive days a slight and continuous upward trend is observed. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the returns based on the EL-corrected 30-minute directional sign 
(EL30R), designed to avoid the expected spurious correlation between the return in interval t and 
the spot direction on day d during the Platts Window. Under this conservative measure the 
direction of interval t is based on the sign of the spot return over the other 29 minutes. While our 
EL30R results are smaller in magnitude, the estimates remain statistically significant during all 
three 10-minute batches, culminating in an average return of 8 bps (Panel C of Table 2). Consistent 
with earlier results, Panel B of Figure 3 shows that negative Platts assessment days experience 
stronger cumulative directional returns, while the movement is less pronounced on positive 
assessment days.21 
Overall, both directional return measures yield consistent results, albeit at different 
magnitudes, implying that there is an idiosyncratic information component in the spot market, 
                                                        
21 Since the EL direction parameter equals the standard fixing direction for intervals outside the event window, the 
DR and EL30R during the pre-event and post-event windows are identical in Panels B and C. 
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enabling a directional pattern to emerge in the futures market during the Platts Dated Brent 
assessment. The findings suggest that, theoretically, a futures trader with spot market information 
could make an average profit of between 8 bps and 24 bps during the 30-minute assessment 
window. 
4.3. Trade Order Imbalance around the Dated Brent Benchmark Assessment 
In order to further substantiate the view that informed trading is driving directional trading 
in the Brent futures market, we next examine the evolution of trade order imbalance around the 
assessment window. Order imbalance is a well-established measure in the literature for identifying 
patterns of informed trading (e.g. Bernile et al., 2016). We apply the Lee and Ready (1991) trade 
classification algorithm to identify Brent futures trades as either buyer- or seller-initiated. Trades 
above the prevailing midpoint are classified as buys, and those below the prevailing midpoint are 
deemed to be sells.22 We measure order imbalance as follows: 
 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡,𝑑 =
(#𝐵𝑡,𝑑−#𝑆𝑡,𝑑) × 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑑
#𝐵𝑡,𝑑+#𝑆𝑡,𝑑
  (10) 
 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝐷
∑ 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡,𝑑𝑑∈𝐷   (11) 
where #𝐵𝑡,𝑑 is the aggregated number of buyer-initiated transactions in interval t, and #𝑆𝑡,𝑑 the 
aggregated number of seller-initiated transactions in interval t (Chordia et al., 2008). We sign the 
Brent futures order imbalance for each interval t by the fixing direction of that trading day d 
                                                        
22 In case the trade was executed exactly at the midpoint, we determine the direction based on the first preceding 
transaction which was executed at a different price, a practice also called ‘tick test’ (Lee and Ready, 1991). Holden 
and Jacobsen (2014) report that the Lee and Ready (1991) trade classification algorithm is reasonably accurate (88%) 
in today’s context of fast markets. 
 20 
(Equation 10) to facilitate the identification of directional trading. We apply an additional 
specification of the direction parameter, as described in sub-section 4.2 (i.e. the EL-corrected 
direction parameter over the full 30-minute window). The DOIB measures adopt positive values 
if market participants trade in the ‘right’ direction, and negative values otherwise. If there is no 
evidence of consistent directional trading in the Brent futures contract, a random pattern should be 
observed. 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡 and 𝐸𝐿30#𝑡  describe the values for interval t averaged across all trading days 
D. The results for the directional order imbalance by number of trades (#) are presented in Table 
3.23 We report the order imbalance results in 10-minute batches. 
Overall, the results largely mirror our earlier directional return findings. The 𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡 values 
in Panel A are typically statistically insignificant for intervals preceding the event window, but 
show continuous and significant positive non-zero values during the Platts Window. The pattern 
is reversed following the completion of the assessment window. With mean values of 2.43% 
between 16:10 and 16:19, trades in the ‘right’ direction outweigh trades in the ‘wrong’ direction 
by several percentage points at their peak. In addition, and again in support of earlier findings, 
𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐵#𝑡 yields values of -1.62% (1% level of statistical significance) immediately after the Dated 
Brent fixing end from 16:30 to 16:39. These values indicate a transaction pattern in the opposite 
direction of the fixing and is possibly driven by the reversal of positions of some participant groups 
following the end of the benchmark assessment. This could also be the consequence of the 
crowding out of informed traders by noise/uninformed traders, as the former abandon their 
positions upon their earning of abnormal returns at the assessment end.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                        
23 The results for the order imbalance measure by dollar value ($) are identical.  
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Order imbalance results using the conservative EL-corrected direction sign are presented in 
Panel B of Table 3. The EL30# estimates show positive and highly significant order imbalance 
values, consistent with Panel A’s estimates, although marginally lower in magnitude. The 
estimates for 16:00 – 16:09, 16:10 – 16:19 and 16:20 – 16:29 are 0.88, 1.53 and 0.91 respectively. 
Following the assessment end (16:30 to 17:29), we obtain significantly negative values, indicating 
an overbalance of trades in the opposite direction of the price movement during the Platts Window. 
The absence of a similar trading behavior outside of the event window supports our directional 
trading proposition that informed activity in the Brent futures market from 16:00 to 16:30 leads to 
an adjustment of the futures price in the direction of the benchmark outcome. 
4.4. The Arrival Rate of Informed Traders 
To substantiate the suggestion that the observed pattern is driven by informed trading, we 
estimate the probability of an informed trade (PIN) model (see Easley et al., 1996a; Easley et al., 
1996b; Easley et al., 1997; Easley et al., 2002). The PIN model assumes that the trading process 
involving informed and liquidity traders and market makers iterates over multiple trading intervals. 
Four parameters determine this trade process: α, the probability that an information event occurs; 
δ, the probability of the former being a bad news event; μ, the arrival rate of informed traders; and 
ε, the arrival rate of uninformed traders. Assuming a Poisson-like distribution of trades, the model 
allows us to estimate each of the parameters of the Brent futures trading process by maximizing 
the following likelihood function: 
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(12) 
PIN is computed as: 
 𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇 + 2𝜀
 (13) 
where B and S are the total number of buys and sells in interval t respectively. As in sub-section 
4.3, we use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to identify trade initiation. Brent futures are 
characterized by high liquidity, and we therefore use minute-by-minute buys and sells as input in 
our model, and subsequently estimate the PIN of 10-minute batches on a daily basis (following 
Easley et al. (1996b) as in Equation 13). In a final step, we average the 10-minute batch results 
across all trading days D to obtain our final parameter estimates. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
During the event window, a surge in the arrival rate of informed traders is observed, as shown 
in Panel A of Table 4. The arrival rate of informed traders (μ) rises from 161.61 at the start of the 
event window [16:00, 16:09], to 162.56 [16:10, 16:19] and reaches a peak of 287.43 immediately 
prior to the Platts Window end [16:20, 16:29]. During the last 5 minutes of the benchmark fixing, 
the valuation of Forward BFOE is taking place (see Institutional Details in sub-section 2.1), and is 
arguably the most important phase of the Dated Brent assessment. This supports the conclusions 
earlier drawn with respect to the directional return and order imbalance estimates, and thus our 
postulation on directional trading is also sustained. It now appears to be a reasonable conclusion 
that informed traders drive at least part of the price run-up in the direction of the Dated Brent fixing 
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price. Nonetheless, the arrival rate of uninformed traders (ε) also increases from 99.71 at the start 
of the event window [16:00, 16:09], to 100.41 [16:10, 16:19], and peaks at 154.81 ahead of the 
benchmark assessment end [16:20, 16:29]. These findings align with the results of heightened 
futures volume during the Platts fixing, as a lot of participants with varying interests and degrees 
of sophistication are coming to the market during a period of very high liquidity. Informed 
speculators rely on liquidity, and thus noise traders, to make profitable trades, and a well-
functioning futures market is therefore characterized by the presence of both informed and 
uninformed traders (cf. Silber, 1981; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). The enhanced ε (154.81), 
combined with the reduced probability that an information event occurs (α) ahead of the 
assessment end (see α of 31.19% [16:20, 16:29]) has the consequence that the largely increased μ 
(287.43) does not translate into a higher level of PIN (21.75%). Hence, with a diverse mix of 
uninformed and informed traders in the market, the probability of a market maker being adversely 
selected remains roughly equal. Overall, the probability of information-based trading remains at a 
constant level throughout the estimation and event window (see PIN in Table 4). Informed traders 
can, potentially, profit from the high volumes and use the correspondingly high level of 
uninformed traders to camouflage their informed trading activity (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Collin-
Dufresne and Fos, 2016). It is important to note that the sustained presence of uninformed traders 
in the market, even in the face of a potential increase in adverse selection risk, is critical for the 
price discovery process (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). 
4.5. Predictive Co-Movement Analysis 
Opportunities to capitalize on oil market information should be greater on days with 
pronounced benchmark price innovations, measured by the magnitude of the differential between 
the Platts Dated Brent price and the pre-assessment spot price. If there is any predictive value in 
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market movements, one should observe futures trading (for arbitrage purposes or speculation) in 
the direction of the fix as the benchmark assessment evolves. In Table 5, consistent with Caminschi 
and Heaney (2014), we report the alignment between FIXDIRt,d and the futures price change 
between interval t and the pre-assessment futures price (t-31). We measure FUTDIRt,d = sign(Ft,d – 
F-31,d), over the 30 intervals making up the Platts Window. If FIXDIRt,d = FUTDIRt,d alignment is 
established; the converse is true in the case of deviations. We condition on small or large 
assessment days, depending on whether the Dated Brent assessment magnitude on day d is below 
or above the median assessment magnitude over the full sample period. Subsequently, we examine 
whether the alignment rates of futures returns with the fixing directions are uniformly distributed 
for small and large Dated Brent assessments. If there is no value in the initial market movements, 
alignment for small and large innovation days should be equally likely. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The sub-samples consist of 528 large innovation days and 528 small innovation days. The 
baseline case considers the interval immediately preceding the Dated Brent assessment start (t-31). 
Specifically, when the prediction of the fixing direction is based on returns in the futures market 
from 15:59 to 16:00, we find poor alignment. Futures returns only correctly identify the assessment 
direction 45.64% of the time. While proportions are different between large and small innovation 
days, chances remain poorer than a coin toss (42.80% vs. 48.48%, respectively). Immediately after 
the Dated Brent assessment start (interval t-30), the first minute return in the futures market aligns 
with the spot fixing direction 51.89% of the time. Futures price movements are 56.44% accurate 
on large innovation days, and significantly different from small innovation days (47.35%). This 
pattern remains consistent throughout the Platts Window.  
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On small fixing days, futures returns have an above average probability of being aligned 
with the fixing direction only 5 minutes (t-26) after the assessment start. On large innovation days, 
however, that probability already amounts to approximately 61%. Halfway through the assessment 
window, the probability rises to 74% (t-15) and reaches 80% five minutes before the assessment 
end. On small fixing days, the probability that futures returns are correctly aligned with the fixing 
direction stays close to 50% for the majority of the assessment, remains below 60% until 16:21 (t-
9), and does not surpass 67% until the assessment end. Overall, the rate of increase in the 
probability of alignment is considerably slower on small fixing days.  
The difference in likelihood of correct alignment between small and large days is significant 
at the 1% level for every interval. The fact that large innovation days achieve alignment faster may 
also imply less noise in the assessment process, and supports the presence of directional trading in 
the Brent futures market by informed participants. 
4.6. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this section, we test the robustness of our findings around the Dated Brent price 
assessment by Platts within a multivariate framework. We estimate the following regression 
models using the minute-by-minute interval data sample: 
 
𝐷𝑉𝑡,𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡,𝑑
+ 𝛽4𝑟𝑆𝑃500𝑡,𝑑+ 𝛽5𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑟𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑟𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑡,𝑑
+ 𝛽8𝑟𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽9𝑟𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐺𝑌𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑡,𝑑
+ 𝛽12𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽14𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡,𝑑 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑡,𝑑
+ 𝜀𝑡,𝑑 
(14) 
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where the dependent variable (DV) corresponds to our directional return or order imbalance 
measure. EVENT is a dummy variable equaling 1 during the Dated Brent benchmark assessment 
and 0 otherwise; it captures whether or not the directional trading effect during the event window 
persists after controlling for other possible drivers. POST equals 1 during the post-event window 
and 0 otherwise. The directional log return on the S&P 500 volatility index (VIX), the S&P 500 
stock index (SP500), the USDEUR spot exchange rate, and spot Gold, are included following 
interrelations with the oil market evidenced in previous literature (e.g., Fan and Xu, 2011). SPOT 
is the directional log return of the arithmetic average of Thomson Reuters oil spot and swap prices. 
The directional log returns on the FTSE 350 mining sector (MINING) and the oil and gas sector 
(OILGAS) are included to control for price movements of related commodity firms. ENERGY and 
ECON equal 1 on days with an important energy market or economic information release, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise.24 EXP equals 1 on ICE Brent Crude futures expiry days, and 0 
otherwise. The SUR indicator captures differences in the futures market on days with surprise 
Dated Brent price announcements, equaling 1 accordingly, and zero otherwise. A surprise 
announcement is defined as a daily difference belonging to the top 9th or bottom 1st decile of all 
differentials between the published Dated Brent price and the pre-assessment spot price. The 
sentiment indicator (SENT) is 1 on days with a positive fixing direction, and zero on days with a 
                                                        
24 The calendar is received from Bloomberg for all G8 countries and includes monetary, trade, labor, services, 
industrial, housing, purchasing and governmental events and publications for the ECON dummy. The ENERGY 
dummy includes events such as the publication of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Weekly Petroleum 
Status Report or the EIA Natural Gas Storage Change. Filters are applied to the releases in order to capture those of 
very high market relevance only. Recently, the intraday event study by Gu and Kurov (2016) provides evidence of 
early-informed trading in natural gas futures ahead of the release of the EIA Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. 
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negative fixing direction. CONTANGO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days where 
the structure of the Brent futures contract is in contango and 0 on days where it is in backwardation; 
this variable is included to control for the trend in oil prices. The sample contains 527 positive 
fixing days, 521 negative fixing days, and 8 flat days. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Table 6 reports the multiple regression estimates. There are several estimates of interest in 
light of earlier findings in this paper. Firstly, the EVENT dummy is significantly different from 
zero, and positive relative to the estimation window at the 1% level, even after controlling for 
numerous possible confounding effects. This abnormal return pattern suggests that trading 
behavior during the unfolding of the Platts Dated Brent benchmark assessment is indeed driven by 
directional trading activity. The POST dummy is insignificant in both panels, suggesting that 
trading activity is not different to the pre-event window following the assessment end.  
We find that a positive relationship exists between our directional Brent futures returns and 
order imbalances and the S&P 500 stock index and spot gold returns. Moreover, a negative 
relationship is observed between the USDEUR exchange rate and Brent futures. These findings 
are broadly consistent with the existing literature on the interdependencies between oil, equities, 
gold and the dollar (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008; Narayan et al., 2010; Fan and Xu, 2011). Furthermore, 
we find that positive interrelations exist between our dependent variables and the mining and oil 
and gas sector returns. Stock market volatility, as captured by VIX, positively influences directional 
returns, whereas no connection can be established for the order imbalance measure. The SPOT 
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variable, modelling spot oil price movements, does not influence our directional Brent futures 
returns or order imbalances. 25 
The ENERGY and ECON dummy variables are insignificant in Panel A, demonstrating that 
the various energy and economic announcements do not impact the Brent futures directional 
returns over the window of investigation. However, in Panel B, the coefficient for economic 
announcement days is negative and statistically significant (10% level). In addition, contract 
rollover on expiry days of ICE Brent Crude futures has no statistically significant effect on either 
DR or DOIB. The regression results indicate that the directional returns and order imbalances are 
stronger on surprise Dated Brent announcement days (captured by the SUR variable). The negative 
and highly statistically significant SENT coefficient suggests that the directional futures returns on 
days with a positive Dated Brent fixing direction behave differently to days with a negative fixing 
direction (refer to Appendix 3 for a more detailed discussion). Finally, structure, as proxied by 
CONTANGO, plays a role, as directional returns are significantly more marked on days where the 
oil market is in contango. 
4.7. Early Assessments 
As with many important information releases, identification issues persist in the presence of 
confounding events. The typical assessment of the Platts Dated Brent coincides with the daily close 
of UK equity markets trading at 16:30 London time. However, on one day in the year this is not 
the case: Holy Thursday. On this day, two conditions are fulfilled that permit the disentangling of 
                                                        
25 We attempt to control for other specific spot oil products such as the Dated Brent to Frontline Brent Futures contract, 
EFP contracts, or North Sea spot grade differentials. However, our efforts are constrained by various factors such as 
the unavailability of data, data restrictions, or the illiquidity of products. 
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the effects of the equity market close on trading behaviour in the oil derivatives market: 1) the 
benchmark assessment is conducted early and ends at 12:30 London time, and 2) UK equity and 
Brent futures trading continues as usual. We identify seven relevant days26, repeat our analysis, 
and compare them to our full sample results to address the identification concerns. Figure 4 
compares the volume and volatility for Holy Thursday each year from 2010 to 2016, providing 
evidence that there is an increase in volume and volatility during the half hour ahead of 12:30 with 
no comparable intensification in trading activity at 16:30.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
At the same time, for normal assessment days, there is no discernible pattern in volume and 
volatility around 12:30. Moreover, market opening or closing times of other major trading hubs 
cannot explain the 12:30 spike on Holy Thursdays. Hence, when the Platts assessment deviates 
from its usual time schedule, we observe a shift in the trading activity of the Brent futures market 
that coincides with the alternate assessment times. The pattern in directional returns is also 
consistent with the results, albeit not statistically significant. 
Figure 4 identifies additional increases in volume and volatility at other times of the day. 
Unsurprisingly, they also correspond to meaningful events, for example the start of the Open 
Outcry for WTI futures at 08:00 CT (14:00 London time), the US market openings (14:30 London 
time corresponding to 09:30 in New York), and the daily settlement of Brent futures at 19:30 
London time. Morning US economic announcements align with the early afternoon in London. 
                                                        
26 We are grateful to Platts for providing data on these dates for an extended period and thank an anonymous reviewer 
for pointing us in this direction. The Platts Holiday Schedule available online allows us to confirm that the early 
assessment on Holy Thursday started in 2010. The inclusion of 2 out-of-sample days increases the sample size. 
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Predictably, the EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report, with a release time corresponding to 15:30 
London time, also causes major volatility in the oil futures market. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to document the observed behavior of Brent futures prices and the 
trading pattern around the Dated Brent benchmark assessment operated by the PRA, Platts. This 
study comes at a time when the regulatory status of commodity benchmarks has shifted back into 
focus with the upcoming EU Benchmarks Regulation. 
We report significantly enhanced ICE Brent Crude futures market activity and sensitivity 
during the benchmark assessment from 16:00 to 16:30, as measured by trading volume and price 
volatility. Futures market activity is particularly pronounced between 16:25 and 16:30, an interval 
of strategic importance in the Platts assessment. The futures price experiences a marked run-up 
commencing with the start of the Dated Brent price assessment period, and is quickly followed by 
a price reversal after the benchmark price assessment end. We find evidence consistent with 
informed directional trading contributing to the price adjustment of the Brent futures in alignment 
with the Dated Brent benchmark outcome during the unfolding of its assessment. Nevertheless, 
the Platts Window also attracts many uninformed participants during this period of heightened 
futures market activity, suggesting that they do not withdraw from the market when faced with 
high informed trading activity. The continued presence of uninformed participants is critical to the 
transfer of price-relevant information to the Brent futures market, and is deserving of further 
research in the future. Over the full 30-minute assessment window, spot market-informed futures 
traders can realize returns amounting to 24 bps on average, with 8 bps being our most conservative 
estimate. Directional trading may be driven by futures speculation or spot-futures arbitrage, the 
informational advantage for which is plausibly gained in the physical crude oil market. The results 
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are robust to a range of controls aimed at addressing correlation between the developing 
benchmark assessment and futures price movements on the one hand, and capturing the effects of 
confounding events on the other. Overall, the results present a consistent view that the physical oil 
assessment by Platts is of material importance to the paper oil market. 
Two caveats apply to the interpretation of our results. Firstly, the documented pattern may 
be magnified by market dynamics, such as participants herding on common signals (e.g. futures 
market order flow). Secondly, some of the interrelatedness between the spot and futures market 
could be explained by an established cointegration relationship, which we are unable to completely 
factor into our analysis due to the unavailability of intraday North Sea crude spot data. These 
limitations notwithstanding, the extensive nature of our analysis suggests that the Dated Brent 
assessment plays a pivotal role in the price discovery of Brent futures. This study therefore 
emphasizes the influence of physical commodity benchmarks on exchange-traded financial 
products. 
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Figure 1: Window of Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the event study design applied to analyze trading behavior surrounding the Platts Dated Brent price assessment. DB and CS represent the price of Dated 
Brent and the BFO crude spot in interval t on trading day d, respectively. Timestamps represent interval start times. The estimation window covers interval t-60 to t-31 [15:30:00, 
15:59:59]. The event window covers t-30 to t-1 [16:00:00, 16:29:59]. The post-event window covers t0 to t+59 [16:30:00, 17:29:59]. 
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Figure 2: Average Trading Activity in ICE Brent Crude Futures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average relative volume and volatility. All measures are reported in percentage terms (%). The shaded area indicates the event window from fixing start (t-30) to fixing end 
(t-1) [16:00:00, 16:29:59]. The vertical black line marks the interval following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end: t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59]. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Returns for ICE Brent Crude Futures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Panels A and B show the cumulative directional return measures using the standard directional fixing parameter and the EL-corrected 30-minute 
directional parameter respectively. The split into positive (+ve) and negative (-ve) assessment days is determined for each panel based on FIXDIRt,d 
described in Equation 6. All return measures are reported in bps (1 bps = 0.01%). The shaded area indicates the event window from fixing start (t-30) to 
fixing end (t-1) [16:00:00, 16:29:59]. The vertical black line marks the interval following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end: t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59]. 
Panel A: Cumulative Returns 
 
Panel B: Cumulative EL30 Returns 
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Figure 4: Full Day Trading Activity on Normal and ‘Early Assessment’ Days 
 
Notes: This figure shows the development of volume and volatility on days with a 16:30 Dated Brent assessment (referred to as ‘normal sample’ days) and on days with a 12:30 Dated Brent assessment 
(referred to as ‘Holy Thursdays’). Volume is computed as the log volume during interval t on trading day d, averaged across trading days D. Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of 1-second 
returns within each 1-minute interval t on trading day d, averaged across trading days D. The time series are demeaned and reported as percentage (%) increase/decrease relative to the daily mean. The 
shaded area marks the period from 12:00 to 12:30 and 16:00 to 16:30 respectively. The normal sample consists of 1,056 days, while the ‘Holy Thursday’ sample comprises 7 days from 2010 to 2016. 
The latter includes 2 out-of-sample days, to increase the sample size and smooth the series without changing the results. 
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Table 1: Trading Activity in ICE Brent Crude Futures 
   Panel A  Panel B 
   Avg Relative Volume  Avg Relative Volatility 
ti Time  VM Sign t-value  V Sign t-value 
-35 15:55  -0.28  -0.52  -3.00 * -1.68 
-34 15:56  -1.11 ** -2.17  -1.28  -0.52 
-33 15:57  -0.62  -1.15  -1.43  -0.7 
-32 15:58  -1.49 *** -2.83  -3.29  -1.49 
-31 15:59  0.19  0.32  -2.93  -1.44 
-30 16:00  5.49 *** 8.55  23.13 *** 6.21 
-29 16:01  3.60 *** 5.64  11.70 *** 3.93 
-28 16:02  2.78 *** 4.79  4.81 * 1.81 
-27 16:03  1.85 *** 2.9  6.83 ** 2.18 
-26 16:04  1.95 *** 3.04  6.73 ** 2.52 
-25 16:05  2.82 *** 4.43  5.81 ** 2.22 
-24 16:06  1.74 *** 2.75  2.96  1.07 
-23 16:07  0.92  1.44  3.23  1.1 
-22 16:08  2.35 *** 3.99  5.00 * 1.65 
-21 16:09  2.33 *** 3.5  2.39  0.82 
-20 16:10  5.45 *** 7.99  7.78 *** 2.62 
-19 16:11  4.88 *** 7.71  1.31  0.54 
-18 16:12  4.47 *** 7.25  4.07  1.37 
-17 16:13  3.46 *** 5.36  2.77  1.02 
-16 16:14  5.36 *** 8.05  5.78 ** 2.04 
-15 16:15  5.85 *** 9  7.57 ** 2.49 
-14 16:16  6.29 *** 10.49  6.79 ** 2.08 
-13 16:17  6.28 *** 10.16  12.40 *** 3.44 
-12 16:18  6.35 *** 10.17  10.12 *** 2.95 
-11 16:19  6.49 *** 10.04  6.94 ** 2.14 
-10 16:20  6.81 *** 10.7  8.79 *** 2.86 
-9 16:21  7.80 *** 12.75  10.61 *** 3.36 
-8 16:22  7.12 *** 10.69  8.46 *** 2.83 
-7 16:23  7.28 *** 11.52  5.49 ** 2.14 
-6 16:24  9.15 *** 15.94  7.43 *** 3.77 
-5 16:25  12.24 *** 20.51  18.14 *** 4.33 
-4 16:26  12.84 *** 20.37  18.04 *** 6.76 
-3 16:27  15.17 *** 28.14  24.86 *** 8.45 
-2 16:28  20.27 *** 36.95  37.91 *** 11.57 
-1 16:29  36.29 *** 63.55  59.18 *** 18.98 
0 16:30  26.33 *** 46.44  44.08 *** 16.46 
1 16:31  13.46 *** 22.82  16.55 *** 5.93 
2 16:32  8.85 *** 14.11  10.72 *** 3.61 
3 16:33  6.18 *** 10.34  8.96 *** 3.06 
4 16:34  4.69 *** 8.46  9.62 ** 2.47 
5 16:35  3.42 *** 5.77  7.02 * 1.84 
Notes: This table reports the results of the average relative trading activity measures. Panels A and B present the results for the average relative 
volume and the average relative volatility respectively. Both measures are reported in percentage terms (%). The t-value is the statistic of a one 
sample t‐ test of the mean being equal to zero. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample 
period is 09.01.2012–31.03.2016. Timestamps represent interval start times. The two single horizontal black lines represent the Platts Dated Brent 
fixing start and fixing end. The interval following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end is t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59] London local time. 
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Table 2: Return Measures by Batches for ICE Brent Crude Futures 
     Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
10 mins     Avg Simple Returns  Avg Directional Returns  Avg EL30 Returns 
From (ti) To (ti) From (Time) To (Time)  SR Sign t-value  DR Sign t-value  EL30R Sign t-value 
-60 -51 15:30 15:39  -0.60  -0.57  1.02  0.96  1.02  0.96 
-50 -41 15:40 15:49  -0.70  -1.00  -0.60  -0.83  -0.60  -0.83 
-40 -31 15:50 15:59  -0.10  -0.16  0.64  0.83  0.64  0.83 
-30 -21 16:00 16:09  -3.70 *** -4.55  6.60 *** 8.14  1.97 ** 2.10 
-20 -11 16:10 16:19  -1.50 ** -2.11  6.37 *** 9.20  1.93 ** 2.30 
-10 -1 16:20 16:29  -1.70 ** -1.98  10.60 *** 12.97  4.11 *** 4.16 
0 9 16:30 16:39  2.47 *** 3.23  0.10  0.12  0.10  0.12 
10 19 16:40 16:49  -0.02  -0.03  1.12  1.61  1.12  1.61 
20 29 16:50 16:59  0.77  1.10  -0.30  -0.39  -0.30  -0.39 
30 39 17:00 17:09  0.20  0.33  0.71  1.19  0.71  1.19 
40 49 17:10 17:19  0.89  1.40  1.59 ** 2.50  1.59 ** 2.50 
50 59 17:20 17:29  1.08 * 1.90  -0.10  -0.23  -0.10  -0.23 
Notes: This table reports the results of the average return measures in 10-minute batches. Panels A, B and C present the results for the average simple returns, the average directional 
returns and the EL-corrected 30-minute directional returns respectively. All return measures are reported in bps (1 bps = 0.01%). The t-value is the statistic of a one sample t‐ test of 
the mean being equal to zero. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample period is 09.01.2012–31.03.2016. 'From' and ‘To’ 
timestamps represent interval start times.  The two single horizontal black lines represent the Platts Dated Brent fixing start and fixing end. The interval following the Platts Dated Brent 
assessment end is t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59] London local time. 
 
 41 
 
Table 3: Order Imbalance Measures by Batches for ICE Brent Crude Futures 
    Panel A  Panel B 
10 mins     Avg DOIB (#)  Avg EL30 DOIB (#) 
From (ti) To (ti) From (Time) To (Time) 
 DOIB# Sign t-value  EL30# Sign t-value 
-60 -51 15:30 15:39  0.49  1.03  0.49  1.03 
-50 -41 15:40 15:49  -0.96 ** -2.01  -0.96 ** -2.01 
-40 -31 15:50 15:59  -0.32  -0.66  -0.32  -0.66 
-30 -21 16:00 16:09  1.79 *** 4.07  0.88 ** 1.99 
-20 -11 16:10 16:19  2.43 *** 5.05  1.53 *** 3.11 
-10 -1 16:20 16:29  1.94 *** 5.07  0.91 ** 2.42 
0 9 16:30 16:39  -1.62 *** -3.78  -1.62 *** -3.78 
10 19 16:40 16:49  -0.91 * -1.68  -0.91 * -1.68 
20 29 16:50 16:59  -1.10 ** -1.99  -1.10 ** -1.99 
30 39 17:00 17:09  -1.07 * -1.82  -1.07 * -1.82 
40 49 17:10 17:19  -0.16  -0.28  -0.16  -0.28 
50 59 17:20 17:29  -0.64  -1.13  -0.64  -1.13 
Notes: This table reports the results of the average directional order imbalance (DOIB) measures in 10-minute batches. Panels A and B present the results for the average order 
imbalance by number of trades (#) using the different specifications of the directional parameter as described in sub-section 4.2. All OIB measures are expressed in percentage terms 
(%). The t-value is the statistic of a one sample t‐ test of the mean being equal to zero. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Sample period is 09.01.2012–31.03.2016. 'From' and ‘To’ timestamps represent interval start times. The two single horizontal black lines represent the Platts Dated Brent fixing start 
and fixing end. The interval following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end is t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59] London local time. 
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Table 4: Probability of Information-Based Trading by Batches for ICE Brent Crude Futures 
    Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D  Panel E 
10 mins     
Arrival of 
Informed 
Traders 
 
Arrival of 
Uninformed 
Traders 
 
Probability of 
Information 
Event 
 Probability of 
Low Signal 
 Probability of 
Informed Trade 
From (ti) To (ti) From (Time) To (Time) 
 μ  ε  α  δ  PIN 
-60 -51 15:30 15:39  178.27  108.09  35.62  49.30  23.16 
-50 -41 15:40 15:49  149.45  91.37  36.86  50.47  23.28 
-40 -31 15:50 15:59  145.31  87.27  37.16  51.59  23.01 
-30 -21 16:00 16:09  161.61  99.71  37.50  51.76  22.85 
-20 -11 16:10 16:19  162.56  100.41  38.18  52.53  23.24 
-10 -1 16:20 16:29  287.43  154.81  31.19  52.18  21.75 
0 9 16:30 16:39  221.04  114.79  30.92  49.47  22.54 
10 19 16:40 16:49  137.53  73.38  37.81  49.05  25.40 
20 29 16:50 16:59  120.68  61.70  38.20  49.79  26.40 
30 39 17:00 17:09  121.03  60.86  36.79  51.73  25.81 
40 49 17:10 17:19  111.04  52.79  37.37  51.02  26.53 
50 59 17:20 17:29  104.19  50.26  37.49  50.30  26.59 
Notes: This table reports the results of the average estimates of the parameter vector of the structural model in 10-minute batches. The parameters μ, ε, α and δ refer to the arrival rate of informed 
traders, the arrival rate of uninformed traders, the probability of an information event occurring, and the probability of a low signal occurring respectively, per 10-minute batch and averaged across 
trading days D. PIN is computed daily by batch as in Equation 13, and then averaged across trading days D. The probability measures α, δ and PIN are expressed in percentage terms (%). Minute-
by-minute buys and sells serve as input to the structural model. Sample period is 09.01.2012–31.03.2016. 'From' and ‘To’ timestamps represent interval start times. The two single horizontal black 
lines represent the Platts Dated Brent fixing start and fixing end. The interval following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end is t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59] London local time. 
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Table 5: Co-Movement of Futures Returns and the Fixing Direction 
ti To Magn Deviate Align Prop χ2  ti To Magn Deviate Align Prop χ2 
-31 15:59 Small 302 226 42.80% 
3.44* 
 -15 16:15 Small 239 289 54.73% 
43.87*** 
  Large 272 256 48.48%    Large 136 392 74.24% 
-30 16:00 Small 278 250 47.35% 
8.74*** 
 -14 16:16 Small 230 298 56.44% 
32.14*** 
  Large 230 298 56.44%    Large 142 386 73.11% 
-29 16:01 Small 274 254 48.11% 
4.38** 
 -13 16:17 Small 234 294 55.68% 
39.96*** 
  Large 240 288 54.55%    Large 136 392 74.24% 
-28 16:02 Small 279 249 47.16% 
10.26*** 
 -12 16:18 Small 240 288 54.55% 
52.32*** 
  Large 227 301 57.01%    Large 128 400 75.76% 
-27 16:03 Small 264 264 50.00% 
8.8*** 
 -11 16:19 Small 226 302 57.20% 
41.71*** 
  Large 216 312 59.09%    Large 127 401 75.95% 
-26 16:04 Small 256 272 51.52% 
8.86*** 
 -10 16:20 Small 220 308 58.33% 
39.73*** 
  Large 208 320 60.61%    Large 124 404 76.52% 
-25 16:05 Small 260 268 50.76% 
15.81*** 
 -9 16:21 Small 218 310 58.71% 
40.88*** 
  Large 196 332 62.88%    Large 121 407 77.08% 
-24 16:06 Small 257 271 51.33% 
13.44*** 
 -8 16:22 Small 210 318 60.23% 
32.39*** 
  Large 198 330 62.50%    Large 124 404 76.52% 
-23 16:07 Small 257 271 51.33% 
13.44*** 
 -7 16:23 Small 203 325 61.55% 
34*** 
  Large 198 330 62.50%    Large 116 412 78.03% 
-22 16:08 Small 256 272 51.52% 
14.89*** 
 -6 16:24 Small 204 324 61.36% 
35.58*** 
  Large 194 334 63.26%    Large 115 413 78.22% 
-21 16:09 Small 248 280 53.03% 
13.59*** 
 -5 16:25 Small 188 340 64.39% 
32.54*** 
  Large 189 339 64.20%    Large 105 423 80.11% 
-20 16:10 Small 242 286 54.17% 
17.25*** 
 -4 16:26 Small 179 349 66.10% 
32.11*** 
  Large 176 352 66.67%    Large 98 430 81.44% 
-19 16:11 Small 237 291 55.11% 
24.58*** 
 -3 16:27 Small 180 348 65.91% 
39.32*** 
  Large 159 369 69.89%    Large 91 437 82.77% 
-18 16:12 Small 236 292 55.30% 
31.69*** 
 -2 16:28 Small 175 353 66.86% 
40.31*** 
  Large 148 380 71.97%    Large 86 442 83.71% 
-17 16:13 Small 228 300 56.82% 
29.28*** 
 -1 16:29 Small 183 345 65.34% 
48.02*** 
  Large 144 384 72.73%    Large 85 443 83.90% 
-16 16:14 Small 235 293 55.49% 
37.32*** 
 0 16:30 Small 173 355 67.23% 
43.88*** 
  Large 140 388 73.48%    Large 81 447 84.66% 
Notes: This table reports the results of the alignment of the futures return with the Dated Brent assessment direction. ti represents interval cut-offs. 
‘To’ timestamps represent interval start times. Magnitude is assessed as abs(log(DB0,d / CS-31,d)). Large (Small) days are days with a Dated Brent 
assessment magnitude above or equal to (below) the median assessment magnitude. FIXDIRt,d = sign(DB0,d - CS-31,d) as described in Equation 6. 
FUTDIRt,d = sign(Ft,d – F-31,d), where Ft,d is the Brent futures price at the end of cut-off interval t, and F-31,d is the Brent futures price immediately 
preceding the start of the assessment window. For the special baseline case of interval t-31, FUTDIR-31,d = sign(F-31,d – F-32,d). Align (Deviate) is the 
count of days where FIXDIRt,d = FUTDIRt,d (FIXDIRt,d ≠ FUTDIRt,d) for the cut-off interval in question. All proportions are calculated as the ratio 
of Align / (Deviate + Align), and are expressed in percentage terms (%). χ2 reports the chi-squared test statistic of the contingency table formed by 
Large, Small, Align, and Deviate. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample period is 
09.01.2012–31.03.2016. The interval preceding the Platts Dated Brent assessment start is t-31 [15:59:00, 15:59:59] London local time. The interval 
following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end is t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59] London local time. 
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Table 6: Regression of Returns and Order Imbalance on Control Variables 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Directional Returns  Directional Order Imbalance (#) 
Variable  Coeff Sign t-value  Coeff Sign t-value 
Intercept  -3.31E-06  -0.44  6.39E-03 ** 2.26 
EVENT  6.67E-05 *** 9.96  1.38E-02 *** 5.50 
POST  2.94E-04  0.35  -3.76E-02  -0.12 
VIX  3.33E-03 ** 2.07  -5.36E-01  -0.88 
SP500  3.46E-01 *** 20.79  6.80E+01 *** 10.87 
USDEUR  -7.56E-02 *** -4.94  -5.32E+01 *** -9.29 
GOLD  1.49E-01 *** 16.58  3.20E+01 *** 9.50 
SPOT  -7.88E-03  -0.54  4.41E+00  0.81 
MINING  8.28E-02 *** 11.68  6.30E+00 ** 2.37 
OILGAS  5.44E-01 *** 57.42  3.88E+01 *** 10.92 
ENERGY  7.60E-06  1.07  2.50E-03  0.94 
ECON  -1.91E-06  -0.28  -4.65E-03 * -1.82 
EXP  -1.22E-05  -0.69  5.44E-03  0.82 
SUR  4.80E-05 *** 5.78  5.53E-03 * 1.77 
SENT  -3.15E-05 *** -4.68  -1.52E-02 *** -6.02 
CONTANGO  2.55E-05 *** 3.71  1.08E-03  0.42 
Notes:  This table reports the results of a simple OLS regression of the dependent variables (DR, DOIB#) on several control variables over the total window of investigation. Panels A and B present 
the regression results for DR and DOIB# respectively. The independent variables account for different effects: EVENT adopts the value 1 during the Dated Brent benchmark assessment window and 
0 otherwise; POST adopts the value 1 during the post-event window and 0 otherwise; VIX, SP500, USDEUR and GOLD are the directional log returns on the S&P 500 volatility index, the S&P 500 
stock index, the spot exchange rate between the USD and the EUR and spot gold respectively. SPOT is the directional log return on the arithmetic average of Thomson Reuters oil spot and swap 
prices and serves as model for light crude spot oil. MINING and OILGAS are the directional log returns on the FTSE 350 mining sector and oil and gas sector respectively. ENERGY and ECON adopt 
the value 1 on days with an important energy market or economic information release and 0 otherwise. EXP adopts the value 1 on ICE Brent Crude futures expiry days and 0 otherwise. SUR adopts 
the value 1 for surprise Dated Brent fixings, defined as being in the top 9th or bottom 1st decile, and 0 otherwise. SENT is an indicator adopting the value 1 for days with a positive spot fixing 
direction and 0 for days with a negative spot fixing direction. CONTANGO adopts the value 1 or 0 on days where the Brent futures market is in contango or backwardation, based on the respective 
Bloomberg metric, controlling for the trend in oil prices. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample period is 09.01.2012–31.03.2016. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Platts and its Dated Brent Benchmark 
Platts, a division of S&P Global, is a leading information service provider for commodity 
markets specialising in price references and benchmarks for, amongst others, the energy market. 
One of its flagship benchmarks is the Dated Brent. Dated Brent is a benchmark price for physical 
North Sea crude oil. Dated thereby refers to a physical cargo of North Sea Brent-Forties-Oseberg-
Ekofisk (BFOE) crude oil that has been assigned a loading date for shipping (has become wet) no 
less than 10 days forward.  
The assessment of Dated Brent started in 1980. In July 2002, Platts launched a process called 
Market on Close (MOC)1 to assess the daily price of Dated Brent, and due to declining production 
of Brent added two grades to its assessment: Forties and Oseberg. The loading date range of 
cargoes that are considered in the assessment was also widened to 10-21 days forward. In June 
2007, Ekofisk was added to the basket. On 6 January 2012, Platts widened the dated range again 
to 10-25 days forward. Finally, in 2015, the date range was extended to 10-30 days forward. 
A central element of the MOC is the 30-minute time frame from 16:00 to 16:30 London local 
time called the Window. Platts operates an online data-entry and communications system called 
eWindow (Platts Editorial Window), which is an OTC real-time open order book revealing 
transaction data and bids and offers communicated to Platts by the market participants. The 
eWindow tool facilitates price discovery in the physical oil market, as it is compatible with the 
WebICE trading platform of the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), designed to combine state of the 
art trading technology with the functionalities required for trading in the OTC market.  
                                                        
1 The MOC process has the advantage of reflecting market conditions more precisely at the end of the day than an 
averaging approach and takes structure (contango/backwardation) into account. 
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 Platts determines the Dated Brent price based on a combination of data received for three 
OTC variables: (i) physical North Sea cargoes; (ii) short-term swaps between Dated Brent and 
Forward Brent (i.e. Contracts for Difference, CFD); and (iii) outright Forward Brent (also called 
cash BFOE). In order to become a so-called market maker in the Platts Window, a participant must 
indicate his interest to trade to Platts ahead of certain cut-off period by submitting a new bid/offer. 
After the cut-off period, no new bids/offers are accepted and only existing quotes can be amended. 
However, so-called market takers can hit the bid or lift the offer of a market maker at any time. 
The window itself can thereby be divided into three phases. The cut-off time for new bids/offers 
for physical North Sea cargoes is 16:10:00, 16:15:00 for CFDs and 16:25:00 for cash BFOE, and 
thereafter only existing quotes can be amended.2 Physical North Sea bids/offers can be changed 
until 16:25:00. Quotes for CFD bids/offers can also be amended until 16:25:00. Finally, bids/offers 
for cash BFOE can be changed until the close at 16:30:00. Price changes need to be incremental 
(under normal market conditions up to 5 cts/bbl) and prices must stand firm long enough to be 
acted upon by a counterparty, in order to ensure orderly price discovery. After 16:30:00 all 
bids/offers that have not been acted upon during the Platts Window expire.3 Platts’ editorial team 
takes all the data collected during the 30-minute period and calculates the Dated Brent Strip based 
on the quoting and trading activity of the aforementioned variables. A price is then established for 
each of the four North Sea oil grades (Brent, Forties, Oseberg, Ekofisk), with the most competitive 
grade setting the daily Dated Brent price. The Dated Brent reflects the spot market value of the 
most competitive BFOE grade at 16:30 London time. 
                                                        
2 Source: http://www.rusneftekhim.com/docs/crude_oil.pdf 
3 Information received during the Platts Oil Methodology Explained session at the Platts London Oil & Energy Forum. 
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A key requirement for participating in the Dated Brent assessment is to follow Platts’ rules 
and guidelines, designed to ensure the transparency, integrity and reliability of the benchmark. 
Platts pays particular attention to the repeatability of transactions, such that traders do not engage 
in non-repeatable transactions to bias the market’s perception of the true value. Moreover, prices 
need to evolve sequentially and incrementally, and Platts does not consider quotes that are the 
result of price gapping. 
It is important to note that the window is merely a part of the whole MOC price setting 
process, and Platts monitors the physical market throughout the trading day as well. The MOC 
methodology has the advantage of promoting liquidity, in a rather illiquid market, as it leads to a 
natural concentration of activity in a short period at the end of the day (Barret, 2012a). Typically, 
the window therefore experiences the highest participant activity. Although the OTC physical oil 
market is effectively open 24 hours, the price at 16:30 London time reflects the most useful price 
for the day at the ‘close’ of the physical market.  
The minimum trade size for physical BFOE is a partial cargo of 100,000 barrels, and a full 
cargo corresponds to 600,000 barrels. The minimum shipment size acts as barrier-to-entry to the 
physical oil market such that, typically, during the Platts Window only a handful of participants 
contribute to the price assessment at any given time, and of those even fewer account for roughly 
half of the total trading activity (Fattouh, 2011; Barret, 2012a). The participating companies are 
mostly major oil multinationals or large commodity traders, but also include financial institutions. 
Companies wishing to participate in the Platts Dated Brent assessment need to pass Platts’ vetting 
and due diligence process which consists, amongst others, of checks on the credibility, 
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creditworthiness, ownership structure, logistical ability, trade performance history, and market 
acceptance by counterparties of the applicant.4 
 
                                                        
4 Information in this appendix was received at the Platts Oil Methodology Explained session hosted by Platts in 
London. For more information and references on the MOC price assessment methodology see: 
http://www.rusneftekhim.com/docs/crude_oil.pdf, http://www.platts.com/products/ewindow and 
https://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/aboutplatts/mediacenter/PDF/intromocoil.pdf. 
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Appendix 2. Relative Trade Size Evolution Around the Dated Brent Benchmark Assessment 
Trade size in interval t is defined as the division of trading volume by the number of trades. 
For the computation of the average relative trade size (𝑇𝑆̅̅̅̅ 𝑡) we follow the same rationale as 
described in Equations 1 and 2. Figure A1 shows that the relative trade size 𝑇𝑆̅̅̅̅ 𝑡 gradually increases 
during the 30-minute Platts Window up to a maximum of nearly 40% above the reference level, 
and reverts to its previous levels after the end of the price fixing. The reversion in trade size, 
however, is moderate with regard to volume and volatility measures. The larger trade sizes suggest 
a degree of urgency in trade completion consistent with trading behavior associated with short-
lived information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure A1 shows the average relative trade size. The measure is reported in percentage terms (%). The shaded area indicates 
the event window from fixing start (t-30) to fixing end (t-1) [16:00:00, 16:29:59]. The vertical black line marks the interval following 
the Platts Dated Brent assessment end: t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59]. 
 
Figure A1: Average Relative Trade Size 
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Appendix 3. Surprise Announcements and Sentiment Differences 
The SUR dummy in Panel A of Table 6 implies that DR is, on average, higher on days with 
a surprise announcement (1% significance level). Theoretically, the profit potential of directional 
traders is greater on days with surprise announcements. Figure A2 shows that surprise Dated Brent 
price announcements more than double the average daily potential gain to an average of nearly 48 
bps over the 30-minute assessment window, compared to an average of roughly 24 bps for all 
sample days. This is also consistent with the insights gained from the co-movement analysis in 
sub-section 4.5. Furthermore, the interval-by-interval DOIB$ during the benchmark assessment 
are, on average, several percentage points higher on surprise announcement days (see Figure A3). 
Directional traders are even more likely to trade in the direction of the ongoing benchmark fixing 
on surprise announcement days; that is, the imbalance between fixing direction-aligned 
transactions and transactions in the opposite direction is more pronounced.1 
The negative and highly statistically significant SENT dummy variable coefficient in Panel 
A of Table 6 suggests that, over the full window of investigation [15:30, 17:29], the directional 
futures returns on days with a positive Dated Brent fixing direction do behave differently compared 
with days with a negative fixing direction. Similarly, the negative and statistically significant SENT 
coefficient in Panel B of Table 6 implies that interval-by-interval order imbalance during the 
benchmark assessment is more pronounced on negative fixing days. This is consistent with the 
general acceptance of a stronger market reaction to negative news. The cumulative directional 
returns in Panel A of Figure 3 of the main paper show that the profit potential on negative sentiment 
days is approximately 31 bps, and only 17 bps on positive sentiment days. Furthermore, in the 
                                                        
1 Statistical tests support the results illustrated in this figure. For parsimony, the statistical tables are not presented, but 
are available on request. 
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post-event window, negative fixing days are characterized by a more pronounced price reversal of 
several bps, whereas positive fixing days experience a drift ex-post of the announcement. 
 
Notes: Figure A2 shows cumulative directional returns for days with surprise Dated Brent announcements (SUR = 1 vs. SUR = 0) 
versus all announcement days. Figure A3 shows cumulative directional order imbalance by number of trades (DOIB#) and dollar 
value (DOIB$) for days with surprise Dated Brent announcements (SUR = 1 vs. SUR = 0) versus all announcement days. All return 
measures are reported in bps (1 bps = 0.01%). All order imbalance measures are reported in percentage terms (%). The shaded area 
indicates the event window from fixing start (t-30) to fixing end (t-1) [16:00:00, 16:29:59]. The vertical black line marks the interval 
following the Platts Dated Brent assessment end: t0 [16:30:00, 16:30:59]. 
 
 
Figure A2: Cumulative Directional Returns for Surprise Announcements 
 
Figure A3: DOIB# and DOIB$ for Surprise Announcements 
 
